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RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS”
Thomas B. Nachbar*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has asserted the power to review the
substance of state and federal law for its reasonableness for
almost 200 years.1 Since the mid-1960s, that review has taken the
form of the “familiar ‘rational basis’ test,”2 under which the Court
will strike a statute if it is not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest.3 The test is hardly perfect. It lacks, for one
thing any textual basis in the Constitution.4 It has been criticized
from both ends, as alternatively a judicial usurpation of legislative
power5 or “tantamount to no review at all.”6 But the Court has
applied it for decades,7 and while the test is not universally loved,
neither is it particularly controversial, at least as rules of
constitutional law go.
If rational basis scrutiny itself is largely uncontroversial, the
same cannot be said for so-called “rational basis with bite,”
“rational basis with teeth,” or—as I shall call it—“rational basis
plus” review.8 Rational basis plus is, as Justice O’Connor
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank
Charles Barzun, Jill Hasday, Debbie Hellman, Greg Mitchell, David Strauss, and Geoff
Stone for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to Jennifer Talbert for
excellent research assistance.
1. See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 647 (1829); Thomas B. Nachbar, The
Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627 (2016).
2. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1980).
3. FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993).
4. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222 (1976).
5. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1801 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Beach Comm’ns, 508 U.S. at 323 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (describing
rational basis review as a “free pass”).
7. See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (citing Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) for the rational basis test).
8. Among scholars, the preferred term appears to be “rational basis with bite,”
garnering 501 hits in the Westlaw JLR database, well ahead of either “rational basis with
teeth” with 98 hits and “rational basis plus” with only 76 (with some overlap among them).
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describes it, a “more searching form of rational basis review.”9
The Court has never acknowledged its existence, and Justice
Scalia explicitly denied it.10 But lower courts11 and scholars12 have
repeatedly identified it, noting a sub-set of cases in which the
Court purported to apply rational basis scrutiny but in actuality
applied something else—even Justice Scalia eventually relented,
conceding the Court was applying a different form of review
without explicitly elevating scrutiny above rational basis review.13
Identifying instances of the rational basis plus test, what
triggers it, and what it consists of has been the subject of much
academic sport, increasingly so as the Court has applied the test
to a series of cases touching on the hot-button issue of sexual
orientation, including Romer v. Evans14 and United States v.
Windsor.15 Such efforts have borne little fruit in the form of
increased understanding. A doctrine that the Court does not
acknowledge requires neither a justification nor an underlying
theory, rendering inquiry into either the equivalent of a
constitutional snipe hunt, and about as productive.
We should be deeply suspicious of a doctrine the Court has
not acknowledged applying, none more so than rational basis
plus. Rational basis plus lends itself to obfuscation as practically
no other doctrine can, in part because it purports to be an
application of “rationality,” which is a nearly universally
appealing concept.16 Close examination of the case that gave birth
to the doctrine—United States Department of Agriculture v.

None of the terms are popular with the Court, with zero hits for any of the three terms in
the slightly more influential Westlaw SCT database. I prefer “rational basis plus,” both out
of a general aversion to dental metaphors and because it avoids any potential confusion in
rational basis cases actually involving teeth. See, e.g., Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923)
(upholding state licensing restrictions on dentists against due process challenge).
9. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
10. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
2012).
12. Attention to rational basis plus started shortly after Moreno was decided, see
Gary J. Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 675-77 (1977), and continues to this day, see
Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational
Basis “Bite”?, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2070 (2015).
13. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (citing Moreno).
15. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2993 (2013) (citing Moreno).
16. Nachbar, supra note 1, at 1650–51.
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Moreno17—shows how easily rational basis plus can be applied
disingenuously. In deciding the case, Justice Brennan applied a
standard of rationality far exceeding that demanded in an
ordinary case. He was able to do so because, although rationality
claims to be objective, a claim of irrationality is not objectively
falsifiable. Study of the process by which Moreno and its
companion case, United States Department of Agriculture v.
Murry, were decided, demonstrates not only that rational basis
plus can be used to import fundamental rights conceptions
through the language of rationality, but also that Moreno itself
was decided on exactly that basis. Far from an exercise in
rationality, Brennan’s opinion in Moreno was an attempt to justify
a result driven by approaches to fundamental rights that were, for
one reason or another, unavailable to him as articulable bases for
the decision.
Recognizing both the impetus for rational basis plus and its
unparalleled suitability to the to the task of justifying results
driven by other approaches demonstrates just how truly
exceptional and problematic the standard is. Lacking an
articulated basis in principle, rational basis plus is impossible to
either apply or constrain in a principled way. That is not to say
that we should throw the rationality baby out with the bath water.
17. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 6, at 760 (citing Moreno for
“rational basis with bite”); Russel K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151,
165 (2016) (citing Moreno as the first of one of “three key cases” developing “heightened
scrutiny” rational basis analysis); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 903 (“Moreno set the pattern for the one-two punch of animus
analysis.”). Most importantly, this is the point that the Court itself has identified, see supra
notes 14–15, even without admitting that rational basis plus exists. In situating rational
basis plus on Moreno, I am excluding some earlier cases in categories that were ostensibly
reviewed under rational basis but later employed standards of heightened scrutiny, such as
in the case of sex. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court having later announced
a heightened scrutiny standard in such cases, it is reasonable to conclude that it was
applying something more than the most permissive rational basis scrutiny in those earlier
cases even if relying on the language of rationality. In his comprehensive survey of rational
basis plus cases, Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel identifies six cases applying rational basis plus
before Moreno. Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 12, at 2106–10. One of those cases is Reed,
which concerns sex discrimination, one was Eisenstadt v. Baird, which addressed access to
contraceptives, one addressed illegitimacy (which like sex the Court later ruled was subject
to intermediate scrutiny, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)), one upheld the
statute under rational basis review but struck it as providing unequal access to courts, and
two related to criminal procedure, an area not generally subject to rational basis review.
See also Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Cases in the Supreme Court from the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 361–70 (1999) (collecting seven
cases from the 1971 term evaluated by Gerald Gunther and explaining their relationship
to later heighten scrutiny review).
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Understanding how Moreno was decided both supplies a
framework for understanding how this unspoken doctrine
operates—by using rationality in an exclusive rather than an
inclusive sense—and provides a guide for conducting rational
basis scrutiny without the problematic aspects of rational basis
“plus.”
Acknowledging the dangers of rationality review also offers
newfound justification for the Court’s oft-maligned “tiered”
approach to scrutiny.18 Although frequently criticized, the tiered
approach to scrutiny is valuable for providing exactly the kind of
moral and legal accountability that rationality does not. While
rationality purports to be objective, the tiers of scrutiny are
themselves acknowledged to be contingent—no one thinks that
nature or logic requires a particular form of scrutiny for any
particular type of legislation. By forcing the Court to choose
among the tiers of scrutiny, we force it to provide a justification
for its choice—exactly the kind of justification it avoids by relying
on rationality to strike statutes that it believes are problematic for
other reasons.
The paper proceeds by describing the issues at play in
Moreno and Murry before delving into the process by which they
were decided. Reference to the Justices’ internal
communications, along with Justice Brennan’s notes,
demonstrates a set of related concerns about the two cases. Justice
Douglas was originally slated to author Moreno and Brennan
took over only when Douglas’s chosen approach proved more
than the rest of the Court would accept. But Brennan’s first
approach to the case—to strike the statute on “morality”
grounds—did not fit the case as argued, and only then did he turn
to rationality as the basis of the decision. After discussing that
shift in justification for Moreno itself, the paper considers the
implications of Moreno, and process of its decision, for the Court’s
rational basis “plus” jurisprudence.

18. E.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 490
(2004).
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DECIDING MORENO
JACINTA MORENO’S QUANDARY
In 1964, Congress passed the Food Stamp Act as part of
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society Program.19 Congress laid out the
Act’s purposes in the act itself, connecting social welfare with
agricultural policy to “safeguard the health and well-being of the
Nation’s population and raise levels of nutrition among lowincome households . . . promote the distribution in a beneficial
manner of our agricultural abundances and [] strengthen our
agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing
and distribution of food.”20
In 1971, Congress amended the Food Stamp Act to restrict
food stamp benefits by redefining an eligible “household” as one
in which all the residents were related.21 Several food stamp
recipients who would be denied benefits under the new definition
sued, including Jacinta Moreno, a 56-year diabetic requiring
special food and medical care who lived with Ermina Sanchez,
who was, even without caring for Ms. Moreno, poor enough to
qualify for both public assistance and food stamps for her and her
three children. Under the change, both Moreno and Sanchez (and
Sanchez’s children) would be denied assistance because Moreno
was unrelated to Sanchez but living in Sanchez’s home.22
MORENO’S RATIONALITY
The Court, following the three-judge district court, rejected
any rational relationship to the stated congressional ends, since
familial status is irrelevant to both one’s own nutritional needs
and one’s ability to stimulate the agricultural economy in
satisfying them—the two statutory purposes.23 At first blush, this
seems unexceptional; people almost certainly eat (and likely buy)
the same amount of food whether they’re related to their
roommates or not. That approach does raise the question of
whether each provision of a statute must individually further the

19. MATTHEW GRITTER AND IAIN MACROBERT, THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF
FOOD STAMPS AND SNAP (2015).
20. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2011).
21. Id. at 530 (citing 84 Stat. 2048, § 3(e)).
22. Id. at 531–32.
23. Id. at 534 (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C.
1972)).
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entire program’s stated end. As the government argued, welfare
programs necessarily entail choices among priorities,
necessitating some exclusion.24 Any provision limiting the scope
of the food stamp program would not directly further either of the
stated legislative ends; it would do so only indirectly by making
possible the parts of the food stamp program that do.25
Rational basis scrutiny doesn’t require a rational relationship
to the legislative end, though—it requires a relationship to any
conceivable end, and so the government offered two ends in its
brief, both related to the prevention of abuse of the program:
First, the government argued that Congress could rationally
conclude that the program was more likely to be subject to moral
hazard by non-related cohabitants who chose to “remain
voluntarily poor” while living off of food stamps, citing the
example mentioned in the legislative history of college fraternities
or “other collections of essentially unrelated individuals who
voluntarily chose to cohabit and live off food stamps.”26 Similarly,
households of non-related individuals, the government argued,
were more likely to have financial support from outside the
household, rendering them not really “poor at all.”27 (College
students again come to mind, although the government didn’t
argue that.) Second, the government argued that Congress could
have concluded that households with unrelated persons in them
are “[more] fluid living arrangements having little stability over
time.”28 Such households present challenges to the administration
of the food stamp program, since the information the Department
of Agriculture required to determine eligibility would be harder
to obtain and maintain. It was rational, the government argued,
that Congress could respond to the increased cost of “eligibility

24. Brief for Appellant at 13-14, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(No. 72-534).
25. See Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1961, 116 Cong. Rec. 42021
(statement of Rep. Belcher) (“If you really want to kill the food stamp program, just jack
it up so high that the taxpayers will completely revolt. Keep all of these gadgets in the bill,
keep the students, the hippies, the strikers, and everybody else, enabling all of them to get
on the food stamp plan, and it will not take very long for those people who want to kill the
food stamp plan to get the job done.”).
26. Brief for Appellant at 15 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8, 116 Cong.
Rec. 42003) (statement of Cong. Foley).
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id. at 16.
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surveillance” by choosing not to make such households
beneficiaries of the program.29
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion rejected the rationality of
the government’s abuse-based justifications by demonstrating
that, because fraud was still possible after the changes,30 “the
classification here in issue is not only ‘imprecise,’ it is wholly
without any rational basis,”31 without explaining at what point
imprecision crossed into the realm of the irrational. (The Court
did not address the distinct moral hazard argument at all.)
Instead, the Court identified another purpose in the legislative
history: a statement of intent to prevent “hippies” or “hippie
communes” from receiving food stamps,32 which the District
Court had cited33 and the plaintiffs had identified as the “true
purpose of the unrelated household provision.”34 Having
disqualified the stated congressional and proffered purposes, the
Court identified animosity to hippies as the sole purpose and
invalidated the provision as based on “a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group,” which “cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.”35 Justice Rehnquist
dissented. Not reaching the question of hippies (much less their
communes), Justice Rehnquist accepted the imperfection of the
statutory classification, but saw in it an attempt to limit food
stamps to households that had not been formed for the purpose
of receiving them, a purpose rationally served by the statute.
Clearly some such households were excluded, which to Justice
Rehnquist satisfied the standard even though it also excluded
some deserving households and failed to exclude some
undeserving ones.36
On this, Rehnquist seems to have had the better argument.
Every legislative distinction necessarily fails at the margin, and so
29. Id. at 17.
30. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
31. Id. at 538.
32. Id. at 534 (“The legislative history that does exist, however, indicates that that
amendment was intended to prevent so called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from
participating in the food stamp program.”) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116
Cong. Rec. 44439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)). But see id. at 543 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (citing “hippy communes” rather than “hippie communes”).
33. Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313–14 (D.D.C. 1972).
34. Brief for Appellee at 17, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (No.
72-534).
35. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
36. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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demonstrating that a statute can be over- or under-inclusive does
little to demonstrate its constitutional irrationality. Justices
Brennan and Rehnquist seem to have been talking past each
other, but the Court has engaged in exactly this debate elsewhere.
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, the Transit
Authority had adopted a policy against employing narcotics users.
That might seem sensible for an organization that operates public
buses and trains, but the ban included users of methadone, which
is frequently prescribed to those recovering from heroin addiction
and does not hinder one’s ability to work when taken orally.37 The
Transit Authority nevertheless banned methadone users because
of the likelihood of a potential relapse into heroin or other illegal
drug use. Some methadone users are likely to relapse into using
heroin or other illegal drugs, but many do not, which made the
ban as applicable to all methadone users overbroad.38 Granting
that the safe and efficient operation of the transit system was a
legitimate end, the Court concluded that, while the coverage of
the methadone was an imperfect way to exclude those who might
use illegal drugs, there was a causal connection between
methadone use and unemployability, rendering the methadone
ban rational.39
Justice White dissented, pointing out the many ways that the
distinction banning all methadone users (as opposed to only those
who had been in treatment for a short time) was necessarily
arbitrary, especially at the margins.40 The majority essentially
conceded that point but found it inapposite, since every distinction
becomes increasingly arbitrary at the margins.41 In policymaking,
there are few “bright lines,” especially so when a behavior is being
regulated not for its own sake but because it increases the risk of
another bad outcome.42 If ineffectiveness at the margins were
enough to establish constitutional irrationality, no legislation
could survive rational basis review.
37. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 571–73 (1979).
38. Id. at 592.
39. Id. at 592 (“As the District Court recognized, the special classification created by
TA’s rule serves the general objectives of safety and efficiency.”).
40. Id. at 606–07 (White, J., dissenting)
41. Id. at 591.
42. See id. (“[T]he uncertainties associated with the rehabilitation of heroin addicts
preclude [the District Court] from identifying any bright line marking the point at which
the risk of regression ends. By contrast, the ‘no drugs’ policy now enforced by TA is
supported by the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program (or other drug
use) continues, a degree of uncertainty persists.”).

NACHBAR_DRAFT 4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

7/13/17 12:45 PM

RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS”

457

The standard applied in Moreno departed from nominal
rational basis scrutiny not only by requiring a relationship
between means and ends that was more exacting than mere
rationality but also by rejecting an alternative proffered legitimate
end in favor of crediting only the illegitimate end the plaintiffs had
advanced. Alternative justifications are a staple of rational basis
cases, and nominal rational basis scrutiny requires that they be
handled in favor of upholding legislation.
Beazer again is instructive. To his concerns about the
rationality of the statute, Justice White added another: that the
actual motivation for the ban was not the safety and efficiency of
the transit system but rather an invidious one to discriminate
against the kinds of people also likely to be drug users:
Heroin addiction is a special problem of the poor, and the
addict population is composed largely of racial minorities that
the Court has previously recognized as politically powerless
and historical subjects of majoritarian neglect. . . . On the other
hand, the afflictions to which petitioners are more sympathetic,
such as alcoholism and mental illness, are shared by both white
and black, rich and poor.43

If Justice White truly thought the statute was motivated by
an illegitimate end, such as discrimination against methadone
users as a proxy for racial discrimination, why did he bother
considering whether the statute actually served its avowed
purposes of safety and efficiency? After all, purposeful racial
discrimination is an equal protection violation in its own right.44
The answer lies in the structure of rational basis review, which
requires the Court to uphold a statute that rationally serves a
legitimate government interest, even one the legislature did not
consider.45

43. Id. at 609, n.15 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
44. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”). See also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Traditional
Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 308 (2011)
(Regulation “must not be tainted by illegitimate purposes, beliefs, or assumptions. An
interest is tainted when the reasoning or motivation leading a state to pursue an ostensibly
legitimate interest includes an illegitimate assumption or belief, such as an irrational fear
or impermissible stereotype.”).
45. FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993); Yoshino, supra note
6, at 760 (“In other words, even if the legislature had provided no rationale or an
inadequate rationale, the state action would be upheld so long as the Court could supply
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The analysis in Moreno is exceptional even as compared to
Justice Brennan’s own rational basis jurisprudence. Eight years
later, Justice Brennan would write an opinion in Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery, in which the Court upheld against both an
equal protection and dormant Commerce Clause challenge a
Minnesota statute prohibiting the sale of milk in plastic cartons
despite evidence in the legislative history that the ban was
protectionist46 because there was also evidence to support other,
permissible ends. Given a plausible explanation, “it is not the
function of the courts to substitute their evaluation of legislative
facts for that of the legislature.”47
Thus was born rational basis plus, which on the surface looks
to be a more exacting form of rational basis scrutiny. On this
reading, the Court was simply drawn to an impermissible end by
the plaintiffs, and having gotten a whiff of that impermissible end,
the Court used the means-ends structure of rational basis review
to exclude alternative ends by demonstrating the lack of a
(rational) connection between the means chosen and those other
ends. After what was essentially a process of elimination, only a
single, illegitimate end remained, and the Court’s holding that
animosity to hippies is an illegitimate end is firmly entrenched in
equal protection and due process review.48
Of course, the doctrine would have been much clearer if the
Court had actually held that, should it find an illegitimate end in
the legislative history, it would credit that end over legitimate
ones. That approach appears to be what the plaintiffs were
arguing for, would have resembled the Court’s approach to
determining legislative intent in cases calling for heightened
scrutiny,49 and would fit the means-ends structure of rational basis
one. Because judges could imagine many things, ordinary rational basis review was
tantamount to a free pass for legislation.”).
46. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471, n.7 (1980) (dismissing
the protectionist statements in the legislative history as an “economic defense of an Act
genuinely proposed for environmental reasons”).
47. Id. at 470. As Justice Brennan himself wrote several years before Moreno, if
anything, dormant Commerce Clause analysis suggested a more demanding standard than
mere rational basis. See Fl. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 154
(1963) (“Other state regulations raising similar problems have been found to be
discriminatory or burdensome notwithstanding a legitimate state interest.”).
48. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2963
(2013) (citing Moreno); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (citing Moreno).
49. Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev’t Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67
(1977).
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review while requiring a closer relationship than rationality—
truly Justice O’Connor’s “more searching form of rational basis
review.” The Court did not acknowledge it was changing the
standard of review in Moreno, though, and so we are left to
wonder exactly what form of review the Court thought it was
conducting in Moreno.
THE PATH TO MORENO
Moreno was argued the same day as a companion case,
United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry.50 Brought by
the same attorneys as Moreno, Murry was a constitutional attack
on another part of the 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act,
one to § 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act making an entire household
ineligible if any adult member of the household was claimed as a
dependent for federal income tax purposes by a member of an
ineligible household.51 As in Moreno, a three-judge panel had
found § 5(b) unconstitutional and the government appealed.
At the consolidated conference following oral argument, six
Justices voted to affirm in Moreno and five in Murry (with two
voting to vacate and remand for further findings).52 Justice
Douglas, the senior Justice in both majorities, assigned both cases
to himself and started circulating drafts of the combined
decision.53
Justice Douglas’s approach in his draft Moreno majority
opinions is well-reflected in what eventually became his
concurrence in the case. In his draft, Justice Douglas conceded the
general rationality between the unrelated-persons provisions and
the stated legislative purpose of the act, but “as applied here” (in
the case of Moreno herself and others like her) it was “wholly
unrelated to the Food Stamp Program’s purposes.”54 In so doing,
Justice Douglas shifted from examining the general rationality of
the provision to its accuracy as to every individual—to be no
broader than necessary to serve the government’s end. What
50. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
51. See id. at 515 (citing 84 Stat. 2049 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b))).
52. Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr., Notes 70 (October Term, 1972) (on file with
the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box II:6, folder 16) [hereinafter
Brennan Notes].
53. Id. at 71.
54. Draft Opinion dated May 3, 1973, at 4, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, No. 72534 (on file with the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder
10) [hereinafter Douglas First Draft].

NACHBAR_DRAFT 4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

460

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/13/17 12:45 PM

[Vol. 32:449

prompted Justice Douglas to apply so exacting a standard was the
connection to a fundamental right: Although Dandridge v.
Williams55 had held three years earlier (over dissents by both
Douglas and Justice Brennan) that welfare assistance was subject
to nominal rational basis scrutiny, Justice Douglas saw the
“unrelated persons” provision as implicating “associational rights
that lie in the penumbra of the First Amendment,”56 requiring that
the act be “narrowly drawn” to serve its fraud justification57 or, as
he wrote elsewhere, a “compelling governmental interest.”58
Justice Douglas described this as “the closest scrutiny.”59 Douglas
translated this form of scrutiny into the language of presumptions,
following Stanley v. Illinois,60 decided earlier that term, and
planned to strike the provision in Murry as establishing an
irrebuttable presumption that the household was not needy based
on a tax filing decision made by someone outside the household
in a previous year—a violation of procedural due process.61
BRENNAN’S FIRST ATTEMPT: A NOVEL
APPROACH TO AVOIDANCE
Justice Brennan was skeptical of Douglas’s approach in both
cases and wrote Douglas to express his concern that Douglas’s
approach would garner a majority in neither case.
For his own part, Brennan would have applied strict scrutiny,
ostensibly to Murry but apparently to Moreno as well, “because
the challenged provision involves welfare.”62 His preferred
approach being foreclosed by Dandridge, Brennan suggested that
Douglas apply rational basis scrutiny to the provision in Murry,
arguing that the connection between tax dependency and
indigence was entirely irrational, since the existence of tax
dependency did not establish the amount of the support
received—an individual could logically be both a tax dependent
55. 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970).
56. Douglas First Draft, supra note 54, at 7.
57. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940)).
58. Id., supra note 54, at 8 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969));
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 544 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
59. Douglas First Draft, supra note 54, at 8; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 545 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
60. 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
61. See Douglas First Draft, supra note 54, at 12.
62. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas 2 (May 11, 1973) (on file
with the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 10)
[hereinafter Brennan-Douglas Memo].
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and indigent, a situation “sufficiently common that the statute
cannot be said to have a rational basis.”63 Brennan didn’t specify
what frequency of incidence would qualify as “sufficiently
common.” As it happens, Douglas did not follow Brennan’s
advice and stuck with the presumptions approach in Murry, albeit
in watered down form, highlighting the possibility for erroneous
applications (for instance, that the tax dependency determination
was made a year prior to the food stamp eligibility determination)
and weakly claiming at the end of the opinion that the distinction
“rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact. It
therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process.”64
Brennan had a different solution for the problems he saw in
Moreno, although it wasn’t rational basis or anything like it.
Brennan had noticed that Circuit Judge McGowan, writing for the
three-judge court below, had struck the statute because the
government had offered a “morality” justification.65 McGowan,
after dispensing with the declared statutory ends as not rationally
related to the unrelated persons restriction, found himself with
only one possible end advanced by the government: the “fostering
of morality.”66
Rather than declare the morality justification illegitimate,
McGowan actually reasoned backward from the morality
justification to the conclusion that it could not be attributed to
Congress. Because the statute regulated domestic relationships, a
morality justification would raise “serious constitutional
questions” as implicating both “the rights to privacy . . . in the
home” (citing the Court’s then-budding fundamental rights
jurisprudence: Griswold v. Connecticut, Stanley v. Georgia, and
Eisenstadt v. Baird)67 and implicating “First Amendment
freedoms.”68 Avoiding conflict between statutes and the
Constitution has a venerable history,69 suggesting Judge
McGowan’s avoidance intuition was well-placed. But in an odd
feat of constitutional avoidance gymnastics, Judge McGowan had
refused to attribute to Congress an intent that would trigger
63. Id.
64. U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 513–14 (1973).
65. Brennan-Douglas Memo, supra note 62, at 2.
66. Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972).
67. Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id.
69. See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948–50 (1997)
(tracing the history of the canon of constitutional avoidance).
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heightened constitutional scrutiny even though the court’s refusal
to do so would require it to strike the statute. In short, the court
concluded it would be better to attribute no end to the statute
than attribute an end that might require heightened scrutiny,
essentially killing the patient to cure the disease or, more
accurately, killing the patient to avoid conducting a test that might
reveal a disease.70 To Judge McGowan’s association-in-the-home
argument, Justice Brennan proposed applying the same
heightened-scrutiny-implies-non-attribution-to-Congress
approach to the lack of a close fit in the statute, since it “was not
narrowly drawn to serve this purpose”71 of furthering morality.
Brennan admitted the non-attribution approach “rests somewhat
on a fiction,” but he felt it was of a piece with the approach he’d
taken in Eisenstadt v. Baird (in which Brennan’s opinion for the
Court had excluded a number of proffered statutory ends for
restricting access to birth control72) and, more importantly, could
“attract a Court.”73 With these arguments (and after Douglas
attempted another draft74), Brennan convinced Douglas to give
him the Moreno opinion.75
BACKING IN TO RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS”
Given how intricate a device he’d constructed to convert the
government’s morality justification into an liability, one can
imagine Justice Brennan’s dismay when he discovered76 that the
government had dropped the morality justification for the

70. Judge McGowan explained that the court’s refusal to attribute the “morality”
end to Congress would not change the outcome, because if the court did so, the statute
could not survive the resulting scrutiny. In a portion of the case more closely reflecting the
mores of the time than even Judge McGowan understood, he explained that in order to
save the statute under those circumstances, it would be necessary to read into the statute
a classification limiting the provision to households “of both sexes as distinct from all other
households,” apparently in the belief that only households containing members of both
sexes could embody the types of living arrangements that would need to be discouraged in
order to foster morality. See Moreno, 345 F. Supp. at 315.
71. Brennan-Douglas Memo, supra note 62, at 2.
72. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447–52 (1972).
73. Brennan-Douglas Memo, supra note 62, at 2.
74. Draft Opinion dated May 3, 1973, at 4, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, No. 72534 (on file with the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder
10); 73; Memo from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas (May 17, 1973) (William J.
Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 10).
75. Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 73; Memorandum from Justice Douglas to the
Chief Justice (May 17, 1973) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 10).
76. Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 73 (“To my dismay I discovered . . . .”).

NACHBAR_DRAFT 4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

7/13/17 12:45 PM

RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS”

463

unrelated persons provision in the Supreme Court.77 The change
was of no consequence to Brennan, who quickly shifted to what
he considered to be an easy rational basis rationale:
As it turned out, however, [the anti-abuse justification]
contention was even less convincing than the “morality”
argument. Indeed, in practical operation, the statute was not in
any sense rationally designed to serve this goal. The opinion
was written along these lines and circulated to the conference,
with a good deal of confidence.78

Justice Brennan’s conclusion that the unrelated persons
provision was so clearly a violation of the rationality requirement
is in tension with the scholarly consensus that Moreno actually
applied something more strict than rational basis review,
suggesting that Brennan’s confidence in his analysis was
somewhat misplaced, even if it did manage to “attract a Court.”
Moreno started out (or re-booted) as a case that might have
launched a completely new approach to inferring congressional
intent (don’t if doing so raises constitutional concerns) based on
a novel theory of fundamental rights (that providing welfare
benefits based on familial status implicates a fundamental right).
The one thing Brennan did not originally plan to do was apply the
rational basis test, in either vanilla or “plus” form,79 although
rational basis plus scrutiny proved itself more than able to the task
of invalidating a statute that he first intended to dispose of on
fundamental-rights grounds.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORENO
One could write off Moreno as simply an over-enthusiastic
but incorrect application of the rational basis test but for the
impact the case has had; indeed, Moreno has had more impact as
an assertion of judicial authority than insistence on the rational
basis test itself. In the years since Moreno was decided, many cases
(including several on the cutting edge of constitutional law) have
invalidated provisions as unconstitutional applying Moreno’s
standard,80 while the Court has used nominal rational basis
77. Id. See also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535, n.7 (1973).
78. Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 73.
79. Nor, for that matter, did Brennan plan to base the case on what has become the
most durable part of the case actually acknowledged by the Court as a rule: that a bare
desire to harm group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest.
80. See generally Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 12 (collecting cases).
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scrutiny to strike a statute only once.81 Moreno has launched its
own line of cases clearly applying something other than mere
rational basis review.82 But it is a mistake to view Moreno as
simply inaugurating a heightened form of rational basis review;
even in the earliest stages of its decision, Moreno was premised
not on rational basis review but on a set of far-reaching
propositions of both judicial review and substantive constitutional
law.
MORENO AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CASE
As Justice Brennan’s notes and his memo to Justice Douglas
show, Justice Brennan’s opinion in Moreno was rooted in
something quite different from a somewhat more rigorous form
of rational basis review. Rather, Justice Brennan’s approach to
Moreno was driven by two distinct theories, both of them soundly
rejected by the Court: The first was an inclination to apply strict
scrutiny to welfare legislation, which was rejected outright in
Dandridge. The second was similarly rejected in Dandridge, albeit
in a different way.
Given Dandridge, Brennan had to accept that food stamp
benefits themselves were not subject to heightened scrutiny, but
Judge McGowan’s interpretive strategy was itself predicated on
the impact of the food-stamp decision on a fundamental right: that
of privacy in the home. This was the fundamental right that
prompted Judge McGowan to refuse to follow the normal
approach in rational basis cases—to rely on any conceivable
legislative end that might uphold the provision in question. By
following Judge McGowan, Justice Brennan would similarly have
imported the Court’s fundamental-right-of-privacy doctrine into
81. The case is Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster
County, 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989). In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, the state had limited itself
(in the state constitution) to assessing land based on its present value. The Court found
that the local taxing authority had impermissibly assessed some land based on its current
value while assessing some on historical value. One could arguably characterize Murry
itself as a second rational-basis case, although the Court has largely treated it as addressing
the use of irrebuttable presumptions. See, e.g., Levine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976)
(“Since nothing is conclusively presumed against the applicant, who is clearly required to
prove his eligibility if he is to receive relief, this Court’s prior cases dealing with so-called
irrebuttable presumptions [including Murry] are not in point.”). See generally Nachbar,
supra note 1.
82. Farrell, supra note 17, at 358 (Rational basis plus creates “two sets of rationality
cases, one deferential and one heightened, operating as if in parallel universes with no
connection between them.”).
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the welfare arena, substantially limiting the reach of Dandridge
by shifting the focus away from the government’s welfare decision
(which was subject to rational basis) and toward the individual’s
conduct that triggered the different treatment (which implicated
fundamental rights because it took place in the home).
Indeed, when one looks at the reasoning that Justice Brennan
had originally planned to base Moreno upon, the differences
between Justice Brennan’s thinking and Douglas’s seem to be
more in degree than kind. Both Justices thought the statute to be
problematic because of its impact on a fundamental right. Justice
Douglas thought the rights were “associational rights that lie in
the penumbra of the First Amendment,”83 and although Brennan
had objected to Douglas’s reliance on the First Amendment,
Judge McGowan had, in addition to the right of privacy, relied on
First Amendment rights as the basis for insisting on a closer
relationship in the statute before attributing that end to
Congress.84 Thus, while the tool was one of statutory
interpretation rather than judicial review, the fundamental-rights
structure itself remained, Dandridge notwithstanding. The major
advantage of Judge McGowan’s approach, though, was not that it
relied on a more well-established set of rights but that it avoided
debate over fundamental rights at all by refusing to attribute the
(constitutionally problematic) end to Congress and thereby
avoiding a test of either the legitimacy of the “morality” end itself
or the relationship necessary to uphold a statute intended to serve
an end that raised “serious constitutional questions.”85
Viewing welfare conditions as regulation of private relations,
as Judge McGowan had done and Justice Brennan proposed to
do, would have subjected a variety of welfare regulations to
heightened scrutiny. Although lacking the color of the occasional
reference to hippies, the debate over the 1970 Food Stamp Act
amendments was dominated not by the unrelated-persons or taxdependency provisions (neither of which appear to have been
remotely controversial) but rather by an amendment requiring all
able-bodied adult members of a household to be willing to accept
work lest the entire household lose food stamp benefits.86 When
viewed as a regulation of the private right of familial association,
83.
84.
85.
86.

U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 544 (1973).
Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id.
Food Stamp Amendments Act §4, 84 Stat. 2050 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)).
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the work requirement could have been seen as forcing a choice
for parents between work or abandoning their children (a point
that Senator McGovern made in the debates over the food stamp
amendments act87), potentially implicating the very same
associational and family rights that both Justices Brennan and
Douglas had viewed as being at issue in Moreno. The
“fundamental rights equal protection”88 doctrine exemplified by
Shapiro v. Thompson89 that the Court rejected in Dandridge had
relied on exactly this connection between welfare and
fundamental rights: to describe the limitation of nominal right to
welfare payments against a fundamental right (in Shapiro, the
right to travel among the States) and rely on the impact on the
fundamental right to trigger heightened scrutiny.90 Justice
Brennan (and Justice Douglas) viewed the unrelated persons
provision as a limitation not on the nominal right to food stamps
but on the fundamental right of association. Justice Douglas had
taken the same approach in his Dandridge dissent. The parallels
between Brennan’s original approach in Moreno and Douglas’s
Dandridge dissent are even closer when one considers that Justice
Douglas’s Dandridge dissent was grounded not on constitutional,
equal protection grounds, but on statutory interpretation. The
restriction at issue in Dandridge was Maryland’s imposition of an
absolute cap on benefits regardless of family size in implementing
a federal welfare program.91 Justice Douglas had (as had Justice
Marshall in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan) argued in
Dandridge that Maryland’s restriction was invalid under the
federal welfare statute because the incentive it provided to “break
up large families” failed to further the congressional purpose of
the act,92 much as Justice Brennan would have questioned
87. See Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1961, 116 Cong. Rec. 44436
(statement of Sen. McGovern).
88. See Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive Theory of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991).
89. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
90. Id. at 634 (“The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise
eligible applicants solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in
moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a
constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional.”).
91. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970).
92. Id. at 502 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The District Court correctly states that this
incentive to break up family units created by the maximum grant regulation is in conflict
with a fundamental purpose of the Act.”); id. at 513–14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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whether Congress had intended to regulate morality with the food
stamp program. Although couched in terms of statutory
interpretation, the implications of Justice Brennan’s original
approach were both constitutional and far-reaching, even more so
than Justice Douglas’s dissent in Dandridge because of the
constitutional justification for the narrow construction Judge
McGowan and Justice Brennan would give the statute.
In this way, Justice Brennan’s original plan for Moreno could
have resulted in a ground-breaking shift in constitutional law,
essentially resurrecting the heightened scrutiny of the
fundamental rights equal protection line of cases through a new
version of the well-accepted avoidance canon of statutory
interpretation. On the other hand, it’s possible that Justice
Brennan would have been no more successful than he anticipated
Justice Douglas was going to be. The fiction, and its connection to
fundamental rights, would have been obvious to all. Eisenstadt v.
Baird—the model for Brennan’s approach to Moreno—was
decided by a seven-Justice court, with Rehnquist (who dissented
in Moreno) and Justice Powell not participating.93 Justice
Brennan’s majority in Eisenstadt attracted only four votes
(including his own), with a strong dissent from Chief Justice
Burger,94 and a concurrence by Justice White joined by Justice
Blackmun to distinguish the statute from economic legislation.95
It is doubtful Brennan would have received any of these votes to
extend the Eisenstadt approach to what was clearly an economic
regulation in Moreno. (Indeed, Blackmun had originally voted to
overturn the district court in Moreno.96) We will never know what
would have happened had Brennan pursued his fundamentalrights approach to the avoidance canon simply because the
government failed to make the morality argument in the Supreme
Court.
WHAT MORENO’S DECISION TEACHES
ABOUT RATIONAL BASIS PLUS
Although the realized Moreno did not live up to Brennan’s
idealized version, there are several lessons to be taken from the
way in which it was decided.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 455 (1972).
Id. at 465 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 460–61 (White, J., concurring in the result).
Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 70–71.
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First, the process of deciding Moreno demonstrates the shaky
intellectual ground on which rational basis plus scrutiny stands.
Both Brennan’s notes and his memo to Justice Douglas suggest
that Brennan had decided for reasons unrelated to rational basis
scrutiny that the statute should be struck and landed on rational
basis as the means to do so only when his preferred reasoning was
no longer supported by the facts (or rather, by the government’s
justification). One might object to that claim by arguing that it is
equally likely that Brennan independently thought that the
statute failed the deferential form of the rational basis test, but
virtually no one has read Moreno as embodying the deferential
form of the rational basis test in the decades since its decision. The
credibility of a claim that Brennan simply shifted from one basis
of his decision to another equally applicable one depends on his
fidelity to the rational basis test. Moreno’s status as the standard
for rational basis plus scrutiny combined with Brennan’s original
attempt to apply a much stricter form of review undermines any
claim that Brennan was also convinced that the provision failed
the deferential form of rational basis review.97 Brennan’s shift to
the rational-basis justification in Moreno was at best an
obfuscation of his real basis for striking the statute and at worst a
disingenuous ploy to re-purpose rational basis scrutiny to avoid a
fight over fundamental rights98 while following a fundamentalrights approach to resolving the case: either his view that welfare
regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny or his view, shared
in slightly different form by Justice Douglas, that residential
associational rights are so fundamental as to affect the standard
of review applicable to economic or social legislation touching on
the home (or both).
Second, identifying the connection between Justice
Brennan’s eventual Moreno opinion and its methodological
origins in Judge McGowan’s opinion below demonstrates the
97. Cf. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013), in which the Court avoided
confronting the question of whether legislation passed pursuant to Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment is subject to the same, heightened, congruence and proportionality
test applied to legislation passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
showing that the statute did not satisfy what it purported to be rational basis scrutiny.
98. Such a move was lost on no one, except perhaps the Court itself. Gerald Gunther
pointed out a similar use of means-ends scrutiny in Reed, Eisenstadt, and Griswold the
Term before Moreno was decided. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 30 (1972) (“The resort to means-oriented scrutiny in all these cases is at least partly
attributable to its attractiveness as an avoidance device.”).
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ways in which the Moreno approach is not really rational basis
“plus” at all but an altogether different form of scrutiny. In a
typical rational basis case, the Court will use rationality
inclusively—to identify potential ends in hope of finding one that
supports the statute. In Moreno, Justice Brennan used rationality
exclusively—to reject the government’s proffered ends,
eventually landing on one that the Court considered illegitimate.
The distinction between inclusive and exclusive rationality is
presented by the different approaches to ends taken by the
majority and dissent in Beazer. Justice White had no direct
evidence of an illegitimate motive, and so in order to land upon
the one he eventually found, rational basis scrutiny required him
to exclude all the other (legitimate) ends potentially served by the
policy, which he did by showing that the policy did not rationally
serve those alternative ends. Thus, Justice White employed
rationality in a different but related way to that of the majority.
The majority used rationality to demonstrate a causal connection
between the provision and a legitimate governmental interest—to
include legitimate ends as within the ambit of the provision.
Justice White used rationality to exclude potential ends,
eventually finding only an illegitimate one remaining.
It is tempting to allow evidence of illegitimate ends to alter
the rationality inquiry, but the two are distinct. Beazer presents a
more pristine example of exclusive rationality because there was
no evidence in the record to support the illegitimate end Justice
White eventually landed upon, while in Moreno, the legislative
history provided it. But the possibility that the regulation can
rationally serve some illegitimate ends does not change whether
it can rationally serve other, legitimate ones. In Clover Leaf
Creamery, for example, the Court had before it both legitimate
(environmental) and arguably illegitimate (protectionist) ends,
and Justice Brennan used rationality inclusively—to identify a
permissible end to which the statute could be rationally related.99
It may be that the presence of illegitimate ends should warrant
heightened scrutiny, but it does not change the nature (or
existence) of rationality itself.
The two inquiries—using rationality to include ends or using
rationality to exclude them—might seem like logical
complements, but they are not because of the low standard that
99.

See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
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mere rationality requires. The sort of instrumental rationality
employed by the Court is defined by a causal relationship between
means and ends,100 but neither causation nor rationality includes
a self-defining description of how close that relationship has to be
to qualify as “rational,”101 what statisticians would refer to as an
“effect size.”102 Rationality describes a relationship between
inferences and a conclusion,103 and the point of the rational basis
test is to require the state to articulate that the necessary
relationship can plausibly exist, not to demonstrate that it exists
to any particular degree.
The lack of reciprocity between the inclusive and exclusive
uses of rationality becomes clear when one considers a third
lesson one can draw from how Moreno was decided: that while
rationality can effectively constrain legislative discretion, it
cannot effectively constrain judicial discretion. The lack of an
accepted effect size in order for a particular causal relationship to
qualify as rational is not a problem when including potential ends
because the Court is only looking for the existence of the
relationship, not its strength. When using rationality to exclude
ends, though, the Court requires a threshold below which it might
find a causal relationship but not rationality, and it is the Court
itself that determines how large an effect size is required in order
to find a relationship rational. Thus, Justice Brennan did not make
the strong claim that the unrelated persons provision would stop
no abuse (for surely it would stop some), just that it would not
stop enough in order to qualify as rational.
Like Justice White did in his Beazer dissent, Justice Brennan
used rationality to exclude potential legitimate governmental
ends from consideration. Justice Brennan had an even stronger
case for the illegitimacy of the statute because, unlike in Beazer,
there actually was direct evidence of an illegitimate legislative
motive in the legislative history: statements that the provision was
100. C.G. Hempel, Rational Action, PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 7 (1961-62).
101. David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. OF PHIL. 556, 558 (1970).
102. See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK AND LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE
STATISTICS 199 (5th ed. 2006). In statistics, what is measured is not causation but
correlation, which has to be interpreted in order to make causative claims, but the
relationship to effect size is the same. Id. at 596.
103. See John Ladd, The Place of Practical Reason in Judicial Decision, in NOMOS
VII: RATIONAL DECISION 127–28 (Carl J. Friedrick ed. 1964) (“By a ‘rational decision’ I
mean a decision for which the agent can give good reasons.”).
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intended to discriminate against “hippies” and “hippie
communes.”104 But because rationality review will uphold a
statute if it is supported by any legitimate governmental interest
(unless the illegitimate one is one that leads to heightened
scrutiny,105 which discrimination against hippies did not), it was
necessary for Justice Brennan to not only identify the illegitimate
governmental end he did but also to eliminate the other,
legitimate ends advanced by the government. He was able to do
so only because of the lack of an agreed upon description of the
minimum rationality required to uphold a statute; once Justice
Brennan insisted on more than a plausible description of the
causal relationship to establish the rationality of the provision, his
claim that the statute was not rational enough to qualify as
rational became nonfalsifiable. By decrying an inadequate
quantity of something that no one was prepared to quantify, the
Court’s discretion became unbounded by the constraints of
rationality.
It is possible to restate the rational causal relationships
mathematically106 by describing the relationship between accurate
and inaccurate classifications, but even then disagreement as to
application swamps mathematical comparison. In Craig v. Boren,
for example, the majority found the statute (a differential
drinking age for men and women) to fail the heightened standard
of substantial relationship to an important governmental
objective that is applied to sex-based classifications.107 Oklahoma
offered a variety of statistical arguments, which the Court
rejected:
Viewed in terms of the correlation between sex and the actual
activity that Oklahoma seeks to regulate—driving while under
the influence of alcohol—the statistics broadly establish that
.18% of females and 2% of males in that age group were
arrested for that offense. While such a disparity is not trivial in
a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment
of a gender line as a classifying device. Certainly if maleness is

104. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973).
105. Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev’t Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67
(1977).
106. See TABACHNICK AND FIDELL, supra note 102, at 199.
107. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.”).
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to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2%
must be considered an unduly tenuous “fit.”108

The 2% number represents a comparison between all males
age 18-20 (the class actually affected by the restriction) and males
who drove drunk (the class whose behavior the statute attempted
to modify). The dissent, on the other hand, did not see the
relevant comparison as between the number of men affected and
the men who drove drunk but between the number of men who
drove drunk (2%) and the number of women who drove drunk
(only .18%), because the statute discriminated on the basis of
sex.109 If evaluated by that distinction, the relevant number is not
the .02 likelihood of a man 18-20 driving drunk but that men are
eleven times more likely to drive drunk than similarly aged
women, an effect size likely large enough to convince even the
most skeptical.
At issue in such cases is not the mathematics of probability
and rationality but a normative question about how to define the
affected and targeted classes. Given that underlying dispute, it is
perhaps fortunate that the Court in Craig eschewed the false
determinacy of statistics in applying its review.110
Of course, the requirement to produce statistical evidence to
support a statute’s application goes far beyond both the demands
of rational basis scrutiny and the likely capacity of even the
federal government were it put to such a test in the potentially
limitless number of rational basis cases it could face. Imagine the
Department of Agriculture being required to produce statistical
evidence about the relative number of deserving and abusing food
stamp recipients as a percentage of those who live in households
with unrelated persons in order to demonstrate the statute’s
rationality. The administrative cost of detecting abusers was itself
the government’s justification for the provision; it would
approach irony to require it to do so in order to defend the
constitutionality of the statute at the insistence of even a single
objector willing to litigate. As Justice Stevens wrote in Beazer,
irrationality is going to exist at the margins of every regulation,
since every regulation is over- and under-inclusive at the
108. Id. at 201–02.
109. Id. at 225–26.
110. Id. at 204 (“[P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious
business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies
the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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margin.111 The rational basis test is designed with this in mind: If
the government can establish a reasoned causal relationship
between the means and a legitimate end, that should be the end
of the inquiry.
The lack of a framework for applying rationality in its
exclusive rather than inclusive sense opens the door to sophistry
in both its malicious and innocent senses.112 A requirement of not
just a reasoned causal relationship but some minimum effect size
combined with both the conceptual and practical difficulty of
quantifying effects in rational basis cases allows Justices who wish
to strike statutes for other reasons to make non-falsifiable claims
that a particular provision fails to demonstrate “enough”
rationality to be rational. Comparing Justice Brennan’s majority
with Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is an exercise in frustration
largely because the two opinions are talking past each other.
Rehnquist argued the relationship between the unrelated persons
provision and the prevention of abuse,113 and Brennan, even while
assuming the existence of a causal relationship between unrelated
persons and abuse,114 did not think the relationship rose to the
level of rationality. There is not only no way to know who was
right, the lack of an accepted principle for deciding what
constitutes the relevant effect size in rational basis cases means
that there is no way to know how we’d decide who was right.
The fourth lesson of Moreno is that the lack of any inherent
principle for applying rationality in its exclusive sense makes
rational basis plus review effectively insurmountable. Indeed, the
way scholars identify cases as being rational basis “plus” cases is
by noting that the Court claims to apply rational basis review but
strikes the statute.115 Justice O’Connor’s description of rational
111. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590–91 (1979).
112. 2 THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON IN NINE VOLUMES (No. 31) (Oxford 1825)
(“[M]en who cannot deceive others, are very often successful in deceiving themselves; they
weave their sophistry till their own reason is entangled, and repeat their positions till they
are credited by themselves; by often contending, they grow sincere in the cause; and by
long wishing for demonstrative arguments, they at last bring themselves to fancy that they
have found them.”).
113. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 546 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
114. Id. at 535–36.
115. Note that by definition I am excluding cases in which the Court acknowledges
that it is applying heightened scrutiny, including cases that were previously decided
applying some form of a “rational basis” standard but which the Court later acknowledged
would be decided under heightened scrutiny, as in the case of sex. See supra note 17.
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basis plus scrutiny in Lawrence v. Texas tellingly continues “to
strike down such laws”116 not “to evaluate such laws.” Not even
strict scrutiny is so consistently fatal. Rational basis plus allows
the Court to strike statutes without actually acknowledging that it
is applying a higher standard, avoiding criticism of its choice to do
so. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, concerning the application
of strict scrutiny to racial classifications, Justice O’Connor only
knew to defend strict scrutiny from charges of being “strict in
theory but fatal in fact,”117 because of her willingness to
acknowledge that the Court was in fact applying strict scrutiny.
No such defense is necessary for the heightened scrutiny of
rational basis plus exactly because the Court does not feel
compelled to acknowledge its existence, leaving litigants with
little opportunity to argue how the statute in question satisfies the
standard. It is difficult to imagine a government brief citing
Moreno as part of an argument that that provision satisfies the
standard applied in that case. Rational basis plus is a one-way
street toward constitutional invalidation.
I am not suggesting that other forms of review are necessarily
more deterministic than rationality review, after all there is no
machine for measuring whether a governmental interest rises to
the level of being “compelling.” In cases requiring an
“important”118 or “compelling” governmental interest,119 the
Court is not identifying such interests as though they exist in
nature, it is defining them. When the Court explains that
promoting diversity in higher education is a compelling
governmental interest, it is not calling upon a concept of
“compelling” as recognized in broader thought; it is making a
claim that the Court (as opposed to some outside authority)
believes this interest is important enough to support race-based
classification and the Court necessarily takes responsibility for
making that claim. The same is not true of rationality review, in
which the Court is invoking the concept of rationality—a concept

116. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we
have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under
the Equal Protection Clause.”).
117. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“Finally, we wish to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”).
118. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
119. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
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whose primary meaning is exogenous to law—to justify its role in
conducting constitutional review.120
Fifth, the pliability of rational basis plus demonstrates that
that the real work the Court does in equal protection cases is in
choosing a level of scrutiny for a particular form of discrimination,
not in applying the standard of review that level of scrutiny
demands. The question of whether we should view race-based
classifications with greater suspicion than we view other
classifications is, unlike the question of whether denying food
stamps to households with unrelated persons will actually curb
food stamp abuse, a question of constitutional dimensions. The
Court instructs that the Constitution is more concerned about
race than it is about practically any other form of
discrimination,121 and in telling us that, the Court has said
something important about the Constitution. In order to make
such claims, the Court needs to speak with clarity, which it cannot
do when it makes largely unsupported (and generally
unsupportable) claims that are tied to the efficacy of a particular
statute, as it does in applying rational basis review.
Rational basis plus scrutiny should stand as Exhibit 1 in the
case for retaining and building upon the Court’s tiered approach
to equal protection scrutiny. Each equal protection case the Court
confronts currently requires it to resolve two issues: what level of
scrutiny to apply, which tells us about how constitutionally
sensitive the classification is, and whether the provision in
question actually satisfies the chosen level of scrutiny, which tells
us very little. Suggestions that the Court abandon the tiers of
scrutiny, as Justice Marshall famously did122 and some academics
have,123 would result in even less clarity and even more intractable
arguments, as every inquiry would devolve into a combined
inquiry that produces only one determination: whether the
120. Nachbar, supra note 1, at 1663–71.
121. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
122. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that
it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.”). Cf. id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion and
judgment of the Court because I am convinced that any other course would mark an
extraordinary departure from principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The unchartered directions of such a departure are
suggested, I think, by the imaginative dissenting opinion my Brother MARSHALL has
filed today.”).
123. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 18.
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specific statute survives. Although the answer to that question is
important to the litigants in a particular case, it tells us very little
about the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The question we should be asking ourselves after Moreno is
not whether the unrelated person restriction was rationally
related to reducing abuse of the program (it clearly was) but
rather is how Justice Brennan could so easily strike a statute that
he was convinced implicated fundamental rights—in two separate
ways—without actually applying a different standard of review.
The answer lies in the rational basis test itself, which claims
legitimacy by virtue of its connection to the normatively neutral
concept of rationality but provides practically no restraint on
judicial discretion.
Even at its best, the use of rationality review to exclude ends
lends itself to intractable disagreements over whether a means is
adequately proximate to the end it serves. At its worst, rationality
used as part of an exclusive rather than inclusive inquiry into
legislative ends can too readily serve as cover for outcomes driven
by other justifications, as appears to have happened in Moreno
itself. My complaint is not that the Court is being disingenuous
when it claims to apply rationality review but actually applies
something stricter, it is that rationality review particularly lends
itself to such misuse, intentional or otherwise, and that it is
possible to counter this potential misuse by insisting that
rationality be used only in its inclusive rather than exclusive sense.
Although one might at first blush see my proposal—to
prevent the use of rationality to exclude proffered ends as not
rationally related to means—as an extreme modification of
rational basis review that guts it of any force, it is actually fairly
modest and unlikely to have much effect on current practice. My
proposal affects only a particular use of one part of the test. The
test remains available to strike statutes in singular pursuit of an
illegitimate end, as occurred in Zobel v. Williams, striking
Alaska’s retrospective distribution of oil dividends,124 or in cases
where the means is not rationally related to a stipulated end, as
was the case in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission of Webster County, in which the Court struck a
124.

Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982).
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taxation scheme as irrational because the state had limited itself
to a particular means of assessing land value.125 Moreover, my
modification only limits the use of rationality as an interpretive
method. The Court would still have available to it other
interpretive tools to connect means to ends, much as it does in
cases calling for heightened scrutiny.126 That is actually what the
Court has been doing for decades. Cases striking statutes while
applying the most deferential form of rational basis review are
practically unheard of, and yet the legal system endures.
In practice but not word, the Court has done exactly what I
propose it do: elevate the scrutiny when it believes doing so is
justified for some reason exogenous to the rational basis test itself.
The only implication under my proposal is that, by limiting the
use of rationality to strike a statute, the Court must acknowledge
it is elevating scrutiny in the cases in which it currently does sub
silentio. Escalating scrutiny, in turn, will prompt the Court to
supply a justification for doing so. In such justification lies the best
hope for the Court to develop the constitutional law of equal
protection.

125. 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989). See supra note 81.
126. See Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev’t Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67
(1977) (describing forms of evidence of illegitimate legislative intent).

